Relationalism is the view in philosophy of mind that particulars in our environment are constituents of conscious perception. It is an important theory of perceptual experience, offering explanations of perception's phenomenal character and its epistemic and semantic role. However, it has also been criticised for a lack of empirical grounding.

In this outstanding collection, an international team of contributors examine relationalism and consider its role in philosophy of mind and perception across four key areas:

The significance of empirical evidence to the theory of relationalism

Dependence of experience on the subject’s internal makeup

Hallucinations and the unity of perceptual experience

Relationalism and empirical knowledge

The Relational View of Perception: New Philosophical Essays will be of great interest to advanced students and scholars in philosophy of mind.

Contributors: Dominic Alford-Duguid, Rami Ali, Ori Beck, Alex Byrne, Elijah Chudnoff, Peter Epstein, Craig French, E. J. Green, Roberta Locatelli, Heather Logue, Farid Masrour, Alva Noë, Adam Pautz, Ian Phillips, Thomas Raleigh, Susanna Schellenberg, Umrao Sethi, Matthew Soteriou, and Lisa Titus.