£44.99
Nuclear Deterrence In U.s.-soviet Relations
Book Overview
This book critically examines U.S. attempts to establish a nuclear deterrent against the Soviet Union and offers new approaches to dealing with the changing strategic environment.
Key Arguments
Dr. Payne maintains that the most influential theories of nuclear deterrence—Assured Vulnerability and Flexible Targeting—are unrealistic, given Soviet foreign policy and attitudes toward nuclear war, and no longer adequately meet the requirements of U.S. national security.
Proposed Approach
Identifying an approach compatible with U.S. security commitments, he argues that future U.S. policy should focus on defeating the "Soviet theory of victory"—on threatening Soviet military forces and domestic and external political control assets, while also defending the U.S. against nuclear attack.
Recent Developments
The discussion covers recent developments, among them the "new nuclear strategy" of the Carter administration and President Reagan's new weapons program.