Introduction

This book addresses the logical aspects of the foundations of scientific theories. Even though the relevance of formal methods in the study of scientific theories is now widely recognized and regaining prominence, the issues covered here are still not generally discussed in philosophy of science.

Focus and Content

The authors focus mainly on the role played by the underlying formal apparatuses employed in the construction of the models of scientific theories, relating the discussion with the so-called semantic approach to scientific theories.

Main Aspects

The book describes the role played by this metamathematical framework in three main aspects: considerations of formal languages employed to axiomatize scientific theories, the role of the axiomatic method itself, and the way set-theoretical structures, which play the role of the models of theories, are developed.

Philosophical Relevance

The authors also discuss the differences and philosophical relevance of the two basic ways of axiomatizing a scientific theory, namely Patrick Suppes’ set theoretical predicates and the da Costa and Chuaqui approach.

Conclusion

This book engages with important discussions of the nature of scientific theories and will be a useful resource for researchers and upper-level students working in philosophy of science.