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The aim of this book is to specifically, expose the conceptual origins of the American failure to deter Japan, to a higher level of understanding regarding the general limits of deterrence and of coercive diplomacy will be achieved.
It is similarly hoped that by underscoring the role which certain basic cognitive (and bureaucratic) processes played
Origins of the Pacific War and the Importance of 'Magic'
Japan's Decision For War In 1941: Some Enduring Lessons
Illusion of Peace
Waking The Sleeping Giant At Pearl Harbor: A Case For Intelligence And Operations Fusion
Will-To-Fight: Japan's Imperial Institution And The U.S. Strategy To End World War II
Power of Deterrence
United States Army in WWII - the Pacific - Strategy and Command: the First Two Years
Pearl Harbor Myth
Whose Back was Stabbed?
Pearl Harbor: Failure of Intelligence?
Surprise Attack
Macarthur'S Pacific Appeasement, December 8, 1941